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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate disaster-recovery com-
munications utilizing two-cell cooperative D2D communications.
Specifically, one cell is in a healthy area while the other is in
a disaster area. A user equipment (UE) in the healthy area
aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless
information transfer (WIT) via an energy harvesting (EH)
relay. In the healthy area, the cellular BS shares the spectrum
with the UE, however, both of them may belong to different
service providers. Thus, the UE pays an amount of price as
incentive to the BS as part of two processes: energy trading and
interference pricing. We formulate these two processes as two
Stackelberg games, where their equilibrium is derived as closed-
form solutions. The results help provide a sustainable framework
for disaster recovery when the involving parties juggle between
energy trading, interference compromise and payment incentives
in establishing communications during the recovery process.
Index Terms—D2D communications, disaster-recovery com-
munications, RF energy harvesting, energy trading, interference
pricing, Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, device-to-device (D2D) communication
has attracted increasing attentions and has been standardized
into the 3GPP release 12 [1], [2]. The key feature of D2D
communication is that two communicating devices in a close
proximity reuse better links to communicate directly rather
than through the base station (BS) in cellular network. The
mobile proximity services target the potential requirement for
service operator to integrate D2D communication in a cellular
network, which is to build new mobile service opportunities
and to reduce traffic load on the network. The idea behind
D2D communication is an underlay direct communication
among user equipments (UEs) that use the same licensed
radio resource can establish locally direct D2D link and
bypass the BS or access point (AP) [3]. D2D communications
introduce several advantages, i.e., relieving the burden of
the cellular network, enhancing spectral efficiency, shortening
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time delay and reducing power consumption to keep up with
greener trend. In addition, D2D transmission is also adopted in
secure communications and wireless powered communication
networks (WPCNs) [4], [5]. In [4], D2D communication is
employed to improve the security issue of the cellular network.
In [5], a WPCN based secure D2D transmission is proposed,
where the Stackelberg game is considered to analyse the D2D
utility of secrecy throughput subject to the outage probability
of the secrecy rate constraint.
Natural disasters, e.g., flood, earthquakes and hurricanes,
normally lead to the malfunction or failure of crucial infras-
tructures such as power grids and telecommunication networks
[6], [7]. On the other hand, after the occurrence of a natural
disaster, telecommunications play an important role in relief
efforts and any phases of post-disaster management. Lacking
power supply and/or suffering from damaged network infras-
tructure, i.e., base stations, D2D communication is considered
as a candidate to serve well in some urgent scenarios in the
extreme environment for providing public safety and disaster
relief services [8], [9].
Radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting (EH) and wireless
power transfer (WPT) are considered as important techniques
to prolong the battery lifetime of wireless devices (WDs)
without physical connections [10]–[12]. As a recent applica-
tion of RF-EH and WPT techniques, WPCNs, where WDs
can be remotely powered by wireless energy transfer (WET),
have become a novel technology in wireless networking and
have attracted more and more attention [13]. A “harvest-then-
transmit” protocol was proposed for WPCNs in [14], where
wireless users harvest power from the RF signals broadcast
by a hybrid access-point (AP) in the downlink (DL), and then
use the harvested energy to send information to the AP in the
uplink (UL). State-of-art cooperative protocols for WPCNs are
proposed in [15]–[17]. In [15], user cooperation for WPCN
was proposed to jointly optimize the transmit power and time
allocations in order to maximize the throughput. In [16], [17],
two ‘harvest-and-cooperate’ protocols, i.e., energy cooperation
and dual cooperation, were proposed to maximize the system
throughput. In addition, cooperative relaying is considered
for using the harvested power to forward the information
received from the transmitter [18]–[20]. Different cooperative
protocols, such as, amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-
forward (DF) are investigated to obtain the power allocation
for cooperative EH relaying system [19], [20].
Due to the looseness architecture of D2D networks, re-
2169-3536 (c) 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2766921, IEEE Access
source allocation for D2D communications is challenging.
Fortunately, game theory offers a set of mathematical tools
to study complex interactions among rational players and to
adapt their choices of strategies [3]. Therefore, game theory
is a suitable tool to model and analyze the resource allocation
problems for D2D networks. In addition, prices and costs have
economic interpretations but are actually system parameters
designed in resource allocation schemes. In underlay D2D
communications, due to sharing the same resource, UEs cause
interference to the users of cellular networks. Thus, the UEs
of the D2D network have to pay a price for their interference
imposed on the cellular network as the result of utilizing
the spectrum owned by the cellular network. For this case,
Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate interference pricing
decision [21]. On the other hand, it is not practical to assume
that the UE always has sufficient power to transmit its infor-
mation. Thus, it needs to harvest power, i.e., via RF-EH, for
its future operation, i.e., wireless information transfer. In such
case, the UE will pay a price for the energy service provided by
the BS, where the Stackelberg game is considered to exploit
the hierarchical energy interaction between the cellular and
D2D networks. Both cases motivate our paper.
In this paper, we study disaster-recovery communications
adopting cooperative D2D communications. Specially, we
investigate a two-cell-framework scenario, i.e., one is in a
healthy area,1 while the other is in a disaster area.2 For this
scenario, we consider the recovery of the D2D communication
in the disaster area via the connection between two cells. It is
assumed that both BS and UE in the healthy area belong to
different service providers. Although the disaster-recovery task
would often be considered as a social corporate responsibility,
making it fair and sustainable in economic terms is important
for involving parties. It cannot be considered solely a charity
process. For this purpose, it fits very well to employ game
theory in certain disaster situations. In particular, we consider
two key processes to support the recovery: interference pricing
decision and energy trading, which can be formulated as two
Stackelberg games. Accordingly, in these formulated games,
while establishing disaster-recovery communications the UE
needs to pay prices for two services to: i) be allowed to cause
interference to the main cellular network and ii) trade for
energy. These prices/payments can be considered as incentives
to exploit the hierarchical interactions between the BS and
the UE. In the following, we highlight the key designs and
contributions of our proposed work as:
• Firstly, the energy interaction between the BS and the UE
in the healthy area is exploited, which can be formulated
as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the UE acts as
a leader purchasing the energy service from the BS to
recover the D2D connection in disaster area. The leader
role in this process reflects the fact that the customers
dictate the market, decide how much energy they would
buy, and at what price they are willing to pay. Thus,
1In the healthy area, the cellular network can normally establish a connec-
tion with the D2D network, including WET.
2In the disaster area, the cellular network fails to connect with D2D network
due to natural disaster, e.g., earthquake, leading to disconnection between D2D
pair who also suffers from insufficient transmit power.
the UE will aim to optimize its energy price and energy
transfer time allocation to maximize its utility function
which is defined as the difference between the achievable
throughput and the energy payment to the BS. On the
other hand, the BS is considered as a follower deter-
mining its optimal transmit power based on the released
energy price (announced by the UE in the healthy area) to
maximize its own utility function. The utility function of
the BS is defined as the difference between the payment
received from the UE and its energy cost.
• Secondly, the interference interaction between the cel-
lular and D2D network is modeled to caputure the fact
that the BS in the cellular network provides services and
the transmission of the D2D network is controlled by
the BS for interference management. This interaction can
also be formulated as a Stackelberg game, where the BS
plays the leader role. The change of the leader role in
this second process is because of the fact that the BS
is the one that should decide the tolerance interference
level as a result of the transmission of the UE in the
healthy area. In other words, this BS sells interference
acceptance service to maximize its utility function defined
as the total payment received from the UE in the healthy
area. Meanwhile, the UE in the healthy area is considered
as the follower paying for its interference, imposed on
the BS, to maximize its utility function defined as the
difference between the achievable throughput and the
total payment to the BS.
• Finally, closed-form solutions to the associated Stackel-
berg equilibrium of the aforementioned games are then
derived and analyzed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model of disaster-recovery communi-
cations adopting cooperative D2D communications. Section
III proposes two game theoretical schemes for this disaster-
recovery communication system. Numerical results are pro-
vided to validate our proposed schemes in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1: System model.
We consider a system model shown in Fig. 1 that includes
one BS, denoted by B, and one UE, denoted by UH , in the
healthy area, where B provides power to UH to facilitate its
future information transfer. In the disaster area, it consists of
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one EH relay,3 denoted by R, and one UE, denoted by UD.
In case of a disaster, UH has to recover communication with
UD in disaster area via relay R due to long distance. Due to
energy limitation of the UE and the EH relay, it is assumed that
there is no sufficient power supply for information transfer.
Therefore, a ‘harvest-then-transmit’ approach is employed at
UH who harvests energy from the BS and then transmits
the information to UD via the EH relay. Note that a power
splitting (PS) scheme is considered at the EH relay who also
harvests power to support information forwarding. The whole
transmission is performed during the time period T .
In the first period of T , i.e., θT (0 < θ < 1) which is the
downlink phase of the BS, the BS of the healthy area provides
energy to UH to support the connection with the disaster area.
In the second period of T , i.e., (1− θ)T which is the uplink
phase of the BS, UH establishes the communications with UD
via the EH relay. The transmission of UH in the second period
causes interference to the BS. In addition, we split the time
period (1−θ)T into two equal slots. In the first slot (1−θ)T/2,
UH transmits information and power to the EH relay R. Then,
the EH relay decodes the information and forward to UD by
using harvested power in the remaining time slot. The channel
coefficients between B and UH , UH and R, R and UD, as well
as UH and B are denoted as g, hsr, hrd and h, respectively.
First, the BS of the healthy area provides power to UH , which
can be expressed as
Es = ηθTPB|g|2, (1)
where PB is the transmit power at the BS, and η ∈ (0, 1]
denotes the EH efficiency of UH . For convenience and without
loss of generality, it is assumed that η = 1 in this paper.
This harvested energy Es is consumed during the time slot
(1−θ)T/2. Thus, the maximum transmit power at UH can be
written as
PT =
2θ
1− θPB|g|
2. (2)
The received signal at the EH relay can be expressed as
yr =
√
Pshsrx+ nra, (3)
where Ps is the transmit power of UH , satisfying Ps ≤ PT ,
nra represents the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with zero mean and variance σ2ra from the antenna at EH relay.
The EH relay employs a PS scheme to split the received signal
into two parts, i.e., information decoding (ID) and energy
harvesting (EH). Thus, both parts can be given by
yIDr =
√
ρ(
√
Pshsrx+ nra) + nrp, (4)
yEHr =
√
1− ρ(
√
Pshsrx+ nra), (5)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the PS ratio, and nrp denotes the AWGN
with zero mean and variance σ2rp from signal processing at
EH relay. The information rate at the EH relay is written as
Rsr =
1− θ
2
log
(
1 +
ρPs|hsr|2
ρσ2ra + σ
2
rp
)
. (6)
3The EH relay can be considered a special UE which can harvest energy
to forward the information from the healthy area. Generally, this EH relay is
located close to the healthy area to facilitate the communications with UH in
the healthy area.
The harvested power at the EH relay is expressed as
Pr = ξPs|hsr|2(1− ρ), (7)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the energy conversion efficiency of
the EH relay. For convenience and without loss of generality, it
is assumed that ξ = 1 in this paper. The EH relay decodes the
information and forward to UD by using the harvested power.
Thus, the received signal at UD can be given by
yd =
√
Prhrdx¯+ nd, (8)
where x¯ denotes the decoded signal by the EH relay. The
information rate at UD is written as
Rrd =
1− θ
2
log
(
1 +
ξPs|hsr|2|hrd|2(1− ρ)
σ2d
)
. (9)
From (6) and (9), the achievable rate at UD can be written as
R = min{Rsr, Rrd}. (10)
On the other hand, the interference is introduced by UH to BS
per time unit is given by
IB = Ps|h|2. (11)
III. DISASTER-RECOVERY COMMUNICATIONS UTILIZING
COOPERATIVE D2D COMMUNICATIONS
In the downlink phase of the BS, i.e., the first time period,
UH purchases energy from B for its furture transmission.
This process is referred to as energy trading. In the uplink
phase of the BS, i.e., the second time period, UH utilizes
the frequency owned by the BS to transmit its information
to UE with the help of the relay R. As the result of using the
BS’s frequency resource, UH pays a price for the interference
imposed on the BS. This process is referred to as interference
pricing. In the sequel, the two processes, i.e., energy trading
and interference pricing, are formulated as two Stackelberg
games, where their Stackelberg equilibrium will be derived in
closed-form solutions.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulations
Let us consider the two following games:
1) Energy Trading Game: In this game, we formulate UH
as the leader who pays a price λ1 per unit of energy harvested
from the RF signals radiated by the BS, referred to as the
energy price, whereas the BS is formulated as the follower
who optimizes its transmit power based on the released energy
price to maximize its profits. Now, we write this energy trading
game as follows:
1) Leader Level: UH is considered as the leader that pays
a price to purchase the energy service from the BS to
recover the connection with the disaster area. It aims to
maximize its utility function defined as the difference
between the achievable throughput and the total energy
payment to the BS. The leader level optimization prob-
lem is given by
max
θ,ρ,λ1,Ps
U
(1)
UH (θ, ρ, λ1, Ps) = µR− λ1θPB|g|2,
s.t. 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, λ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ Ps ≤ PT .
(12)
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2) Follower Level: The BS acts as the follower who sells
its energy service to UH to support the connection
between the healthy area and the disaster area. The
BS aims to maximize its utility function defined as the
difference between the energy payment from UH and
the energy cost. Thus, the follower level optimization
problem can be expressed as
max
PB≥0
UB,1(PB, λ1, θ) = θ(λ1PB|g|2 −F(PB)), (13)
where F(PB) is used to model the cost of the BS per unit
time for wirelessly charging. In this paper, we consider
the following quadratic model4 for the cost function of
the PBs.
F(x) = Ax2 +Bx, (14)
where A > 0 and B > 0 are the constants.
The Stackelberg game for the energy trading are formulated
by combining both problems (12) and (13).
2) Interference Pricing Game: In this game, the BS is
considered as the leader who announces an interference price
λ2 to maximize its own utility, and UH is formulated as the
follower to obtain the optimal transmit power maximizing its
own utility. In the following, we formulate the optimizations
of the leader and the follower:
1) Leader Level: The BS announces a price for the inter-
ference caused by the UH to maximize its own profit,
which is defined as the total payment from UH . Thus,
the leader level optimization problem can be written as
max
λ2≥0
UB,2(λ2) = λ2(1− θ)Ps|h|2,
s.t. Ps|h|2 ≤ Ith. (15)
2) Follower Level: UH pays a price for the interference
to maximize its utility function defined as the difference
between the achievable throughput and the total payment
to the BS. Thus, the follower level optimization problem
is given by
max
Ps
U
(2)
UH (Ps) = µR− λ2(1− θ)IB,
s.t. 0 ≤ Ps ≤ PT . (16)
The Stackelberg game for the interference pricing are formu-
lated by combining both problems (15) and (16).
In the following, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for
both formulated games, and analyze the connection between
both proposed games.
B. Solution to Proposed Stackelberg Games
In this subsection, we derive closed-form Stackelberg equi-
librium for both formulated games by analyzing the optimal
strategies for the BS and UH to maximize their own utilities.
4Note that the quadratic function shown in (14) has been applied in the
energy market to model the energy cost [22].
1) Solution to Energy Trading Game: First, we consider the
energy trading game, and derive the optimal power allocation
of the BS PB. For given λ1 and θ, the utility UB,1 in (13)
is obviously quadratic function with respect to PB and the
constraint is linear, which indicates that (13) is a convex
optimization problem. Thus, the optimal solution to PB can
be achieved by the following theorem:
Theorem 1: For given λ1 and θ, the optimal solution to the
problem (13) can be achieved as
P optB =
[
λ1|g|2 −B
2A
]+
, (17)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0).
Proof: It is easily observed that the objective function to
the problem (13) is a concave function with respect to PB.
Taking the first derivatives of (13) and equalling it to zero,
one can have
∂UB,1
∂PB
= θ(λ1|g|2 − 2APB −B) = 0,
⇒ P optB =
{
λ1|g|2−B
2A , for λ1|g|2 −B > 0,
0, for λ1|g|2 −B ≤ 0.
(18)
Thus, we have proved Theorem 1.
Next, we derive the optimal solution of the PS ratio ρ, which
can be achieved by taking (10). The first term of (10), i.e.,
Rsr, is a monotonically increasing function in terms of ρ,
whereas the second term of (10), i.e., Rrd, is a monotonically
decreasing over ρ. Hence, in order to obtain the optimal
solution ρopt, both terms satisfy the following equation
ρPs|hsr|2
ρσ2ra + σ
2
rp
=
ξPs|hsr|2|hrd|2(1− ρ)
σ2d
. (19)
Therefore, the optimal PS ratio, i.e., ρopt, can be written as
(20) on the top of next page. Thus, we rewrite the (12) by
substituting ρopt and P opts = PT as
max
θ,λ1
U
(1)
UH (θ, λ1) = a log
[
1 + C
(
λ1X − 2Y
)]
− λ21X + 2λ1Y,
s.t. 0 < θ < 1, λ1 ≥ 0, (21)
where
a=
µ(1−θ)
2
, C =
2ρopt|hsr|2
(1−θ)(ρoptσ2ra+σ2rp)
,
X=
θ|g|4
2A
, and Y =
Bθ|g|2
4A
.
To proceed, we need to solve the problem (21), however,
it is not easy to find the optimal solutions for λ1 and θ
simultaneously due to the complexity of its objective function.
In order to circumvent this issue, we consider a two-step
approach. Particularly, we first find the closed-form solution
for λ1 for a given θ, then, the optimal solution for θ can be
achieved by employing one-dimensional (1D) search. Thus,
the following theorem is required to obtain the optimal energy
price λopt1 for fixed θ.
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ρopt =
−[σ2d − ξ|hrd|2(σ2rp − σ2ra)] +
√
[σ2d − ξ|hrd|2(σ2rp − σ2ra)]2 + 4ξ2|hrd|4σ2raσ2rp
2ξ|hrd|2σ2ra
. (20)
Theorem 2: The optimal solution of the energy price,
denoted by λopt1 can be given by
λopt1 =
−2(1− 3CY ) +√4(1− CY )2 + 8aC2X
4CX
. (22)
Proof: We first fix θ to take the first derivative of the
objective function in (21) and equal it to zero as
∂U
(1)
UH
∂λ1
=
aCX
1 + C[(λ1X − Y )− Y ] − 2(λ1X − Y ) = 0,
⇒ 2C(λ1X − Y )2 + 2(1− CY )(λ1X − Y )− aCX = 0.
(23)
By solving (23), we haveλ(1)1 =
−2(1−3CY )−
√
4(1−CY )2+8aC2X
4CX ,
λ
(2)
1 =
−2(1−3CY )+
√
4(1−CY )2+8aC2X
4CX .
(24)
Now, let us verify the validity of both solutions shown in
(24). The objective function in (21) includes the logarithm
term, where the term inside the logarithm function should be
non-negative. Thus, we substitute these solutions shown in (24)
into the logarithm term of (21), respectively. We first check
λ
(1)
1 as follows:
1 + C
(−2(1− 3CY )−√4(1− CY )2 + 8aC2X
4C
− 2Y
)]
= 1 + C
(−2(1− CY )−√4(1− CY )2 + 8aC2X
4C
)
< 1 + C
(−2(1− CY )− |2(1− CY )|
4C
)
≤ 1. (25)
Similarly, we check λ(2)1 as
1 + C
(−2(1− 3CY ) +√4(1− CY )2 + 8aC2X
4C
− 2Y
)]
= 1 + C
(−2(1− CY ) +√4(1− CY )2 + 8aC2X
4C
)
> 1 + C
(−2(1− CY )− |2(1− CY )|
4C
)
≥ 1. (26)
From the above analyzes, one can observe that λ(2)1 is the
valid stationary point. Due to the concavity of the objective
function in (21) in terms of λ1, its second-order derivative is
less than zero, which indicates that its maximum value is the
stationary point λ(2)1 . Also, it is easily verified that λ
(2)
1 >
0, which satisfies the constraint in (21). Thus, the optimal
solution to (21), denote by λopt1 is the stationary point λ
(2)
1 .
We have already achieved the optimal energy price λopt1 for
a given θ. Substituting λopt1 into the problem (21), we have the
following optimization problem with respect to θ:
max
θ
U
(1)
UH (θ, λ
opt
1 ), s.t. 0 < θ < 1. (27)
The problem (27) can be efficiently solved via 1D search.
The optimal solution to (27), denoted by θopt, can be achieved
by
θopt = arg max
θ∈(0,1)
U
(1)
UH (θ, λ
opt
1 ). (28)
This has completed the derivation of the Stackelberg equilib-
rium (P optB , ρ
opt, λopt1 , θ
opt) for the formulated energy trading
based Stackelberg game, which have been shown in (17), (20),
(22) and (28).
2) Solution to Interference Pricing Game: In this subsec-
tion, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for the interference
pricing game. First, we consider the optimization problem (16)
with ρopt as follows:
max
Ps
U
(2)
UH (Ps) = a log(1 +DPs)− λ2EPs,
s.t. 0 ≤ Ps ≤ PT . (29)
where
D =
ρopt|hsr|2
ρoptσ2ra + σ
2
rp
, E = (1− θ)|h|2.
It is easily verified that (29) is a convex optimization problem
in terms of Ps. Thus, the optimal solution to (29) can be
achieved by equalling the first derivative of U (2)UH to zero as
follows:
∂U
(2)
UH
∂Ps
=
aD
1 +DPs
− λ2E = 0,
⇒ Ps =
[
a
λ2E
− 1
D
]PT
0
, (30)
where [x]ba := max{min{x, b}, a}.
Now we focus on the interference pricing decision for
(15). Particularly, the optimal interference price λ2 can be
achieved via 1D search. In order to illustrate more insights
into the interference interaction between the BS and the D2D
transmitter, we consider the following the equations regarding
the lower and upper bound of λ2:
λup2 =
aD
E
, λlow2 =
a
(PT +
1
D )E
. (31)
It is easily verified that (31) holds when either Ps = 0 or PT .
From (31), we have the following properties:
1) 0 ≤ UB,2(λ2) <∞;
2) UB,2(λ2) = 0 if λ2 = 0 or λ2 ≥ λup2 ;
3) UB,2(λ2) = λ2(1− θ)PT |h|2 if 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ λlow2 .
Proof: First, it is easily verified that property 1 always
holds. Then, we provide the proof to show properties 2 and 3.
Both of λlow2 and λ
up
2 shown in (31) can be achieved by letting
Ps = 0 and Ps = PT , respectively. If
λ2 ≥ λup2 ,
aD
E
, (32)
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which indicates
a
λ2E
≤ 1
D
. (33)
According to (30), it is easily concluded that Ps = 0, and by
substituting it into (15), we have UB,2(λ2) = 0. Additionally,
UB,2(λ2) = 0 if λ2 = 0 always holds. Similarly if,
λ2 ≤ λlow2 ,
a
(PT +
1
D )E
,
⇒ a
λ2E
≥ PT + 1
D
,⇒ a
λ2E
− 1
D
≥ PT . (34)
According to (30), it is easily concluded that Ps = PT , and
replace it into (15), we have UB,2(λ2) = λ2(1 − θ)PT |h|2.
Moreover, considering the case UB,2(λ2) with Ps = 0, we
have
a
λ2E
− 1
D
≤ 0,⇒ λ2 ≥ aD
E
, λup2 . (35)
Similarly, for the case UB,2(λ2) = λ2(1−θ)PT |h|2 with Ps =
PT , or
a
λ2E
− 1
D
≥ PT ,⇒ 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ a
(PT +
1
D )E
, λlow2 . (36)
Thus, Properties 2 and 3 have been proved.
Remark 1: The optimal interference price λ2 lies in a certain
range, depending on numbers of factors such as the channel
conditions, distance between the BS and UH , interference, BS
transmit power, energy price, and energy transfer time alloca-
tion. The interference utility function is always nonnegative,
since the transmit power of UH is nonnegative with energy
harvesting from the BS. The maximum utility function is
bounded with the maximum harvested power of UH , i.e., PT ,
also, the revenue will disappear when the interference price is
too low or two high.
It is easily verified that Ps is a strictly decreasing function
with respect to λ2 in the interval [λlow2 , λ
up
2 ]. For the interfer-
ence pricing game, we have the following descriptions:
1) When 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ λlow2 , UH transmits with its maxi-
mum power, while the interference at the BS is upper
bounded. Additionally, the associated payment UB,2 to
the BS is linear with respect to λ2. The straightforward
explanation is that the BS announces a low enough price,
in which UH can afford this payment released by the BS
and transmit its power at a high level.
2) When λ2 ≥ λlow2 , UH reduces its transmit power with
increased price λ2 released by the BS. In addition, UH
transmitted power is decreasing due to λ2.
3) When λ2 ≥ λup2 , the BS’s profits for interference
disappears, since UB,2(λ2) = 0.
Now, we describe the monotonicity for utility function UB,2
in the interval [λlow2 , λ
up
2 ]. First, this price interval is divided
into sufficient small intervals. Then, for each small interval, the
BS optimize the interference price paid by UH to maximize its
utility function while maintaining the interference constraint.
In the sequel, we summarize this interference pricing algorithm
in the interval [λlow2 λ
up
2 ] in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Interference pricing algorithm
1) BS initializes the interference price λ2 at the range
[λlow2 λ
up
2 ].
2) Set η is a small positive value.
3) For count = λlow2 : η : λ
up
2
a) BS calculate the received interference IB and its
utility function UB,2.
b) If IB(λ2(count)) ≤ Ith, then, UB,2 =
λ2(count)(1− θ)Ps|h|2;
else UB,2 = λ2(count)(1− θ)Ith.
4) end
5) Output λopt2 ← arg maxλ2 UB,2(λ2).
Note that when the problem (15) achieves its optimality in
the interval [λlow2 λ
up
2 ], it should satisfy Ps =
Ith
|h|2 . Thus, we
can obtain the optimal solution to the interference price in
terms of closed-form solution as follows:
λopt2 =
a
( Ith|h|2 +
1
D )E
. (37)
Remark 2: When Ps = PT to satisfy the maximum utility
function in (12), also the interference constraint should be
satisfied as well, thus, the closed-form interference price can
be expressed as follows
λopt2 =
a
(min{PT , Ith|h|2 }+ 1D )E
. (38)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to evaluate
the performance of our proposed algorithms for interference
management and energy trading in D2D disaster cellular
networks shown in Section II. We assume that the fading
channels are modelled as Cd−α, where C is the small-scale
fading factor which is modelled as Rayleigh fading process,
d denotes as d1, d2 and d3, which are the distance from B to
UH , UH to R, and R to UD, respectively. The noise power is
assumed to be σ2ra = σ
2
rp = σ
2
d = 10
−4 mW. Also, we assume
that A = B = 1 for quadratic energy cost model. Moreover,
we set ξ = 0.8 and Ith = 0.1 unless otherwise specified.
First, we evaluate the profits performances, i.e., utility
function and the price, of two proposed games versus the
target interference Ith in Figure 2. From this results, it is
observed that the utility function U (1)UH and the energy price
λ1 are constants as the target interference Ith increases. In
Figure 2(a), the utility function U (2)UH increases with Ith at the
beginning of interference regimes, and approximately achieves
to a stable status with the increasing of Ith. Whereas in Figure
2(b), the price λ2 decreases in the low interference regimes,
and with the increasing of Ith, it approximately approaches
to a constant level. This is because of the fact that once the
achievable interference exceeds the target interference, UH
will not gain more revenue and the price paid by UH for the
interference pricing decision will not decrease.
Next, we evaluate the profit performances of two proposed
games versus the EH efficiency ξ. In Figure 3, one can observe
that the utility functions, i.e., U (1)UH and U
(2)
UH , and the prices,
i.e., λ1 and λ2, get increased as ξ increases. Also, in Figure
3(a), the energy trading game has a better performance than the
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Fig. 2: The comparison between energy trading and interference
pricing with the interference Ith.
interference pricing game in terms of the utility function,which
means that UH can achieve more profits by employing energy
trading interaction with the BS than employing the interference
pricing decision. Whereas, in Figure 3(b), UH will pay more
price for the interference than the energy service, which
highlights the financial efficiency for the energy trading.
Then, we exploit the impact of the profit performances
of these two proposed game-theoretical schemes versus the
distance between the BS and UH , i.e., d1. Figure 4 shows
the utility function and the price against the distance between
the BS and UH , i.e., d1. From Figure 4(a), one can observe
that U (1)UH decreases with the increasing of d1, whereas U
(2)
UH
increases at low distance regimes, and then declines at high
distance regimes. In addition, it can be seen from Figure 4(b)
that the prices are increasing as d1 increases. This is due to
the fact that, in the low distance regimes, UH transmit power
decreases with the increasing of d1 when the interference price
paid by UH , i.e., λ2, is located in the range of [λlow2 λup2 ],
which may lead to the increasing of U (1)UH . On the other side,
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Fig. 3: The comparison between energy trading and interference
pricing with EH efficiency ξ.
as d1 increases, UH transmit power is up to its harvested
power such that this interference price λ2 falls in the range of
(0 λlow2 ], which means that U
(2)
UH will decrease as d1 increases.
In addition, U (1)UH has better profit performance gains than U
(2)
UH
does, and the energy trading scheme has more financial saving
than the interference pricing scheme does.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the disaster management in two-
cell D2D cooperative communications. Specifically, the UE
in the healthy area aims to assist the connection with the
UE in disaster area via an EH relay. In the healthy area,
we considered a practical scenario that both BS and UE
belong to different service providers, thus UE needs to pay
prices as incentives for two services: energy transfer and
interference services. These two processes are formulated as
two Stackelberg games, i.e., energy trading and interference
pricing games. We derived the Stackelberg equilibriums for
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Fig. 4: The comparison between energy trading and interference
pricing with distance between BS and UH .
both proposed games in closed-form solutions. Finally, nu-
merical results reveal that the D2D network obtains higher
performance, i.e., higher utility and lower price, during the
energy trading phase than that during the interference pricing
phase. This is due to the fact that the energy harvesting
operation of the D2D network is not limited in the downlink
phase of the base station while the transmitting operation of
the D2D network is restricted by the interference threshold in
the uplink phase of the base station. This work has provided
a sustainable and fair framework to assist communications
in disaster recovery where multiple parties are involved and
compromised to some extent in resources.
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